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F·rom the Bankruptcy qourts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
A SELLER'S RIGHT TO
RECLAIM GOODS UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE-A LOOK
AT CURRENT CASES

The first thought that comes to
an unpaid seller of goods upon obtaining information that a customer
has become a debtor under chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code is to obtain a quick printout of the customer's record from the computer.
The second thought is to ascertain
how recently the company's goods
were delivered to the debtor. A further thought comes to mind: Is there
time to request a return of the goods?
All of this is done with an eye to
reclamation. Although it should be
easy to ascertain these facts, the
computer printout may not be current and invoices and delivery receipts may have to be checked.
Assuming that all data are immediately available, how easy is recovery for the seller? Although
Congress anticipated that the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code would
provide an easy answer to the problem of recovery for the seller, recent
decisions indicate that a tortuous
road still lies ahead for the credit
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grantor. In particular, two recent
cases which may be helpful in indicating some of the hazards which
face the unpaid seller in an effort to
recover the goods are In re Flagstaff
Foodservice Corporation,! and In re
Contract Interiors, Inc. 2
Section 546 (c) of the Bankruptcy
Code (BC) contains an important
limitation on the avoiding powers of
the trustee or debtor in possession
which is designed to benefit sellers
who deliver goods to the debtor on
credit shortly before the commencement of the bankruptcy case. That
section subjects the trustee's rights
and powers of avoidance "to any
statutory right or common law right
of a seller, in the ordinary course of
such seller's business, of goods to
the debtor to reclaim such goods if
the debtor has received such goods
while insolvent." 3
There follows a significant "but";
namely, this right to reclaim is dependent upon the seller demanding
"in writing reclamation of such goods
before ten days after receipt of such
goods by the debtor." 4 Assuming
1 BCD 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Babitt, J.).
2 8 BCD 174 (B.D. Mich. 1981)
(Brody, J.).
3 11 U.S.C. § 546(c). The avoiding
powers to which the section refers includes the trustee's status as a lien
creditor (§ 544(a) ), the power to
avoid certain statutory liens ( § 545),
the power to avoid preferences ( § 547),
and the power to avoid postpetition
transfers (§ 549).
4 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(l).
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such notice has been sent, the bankruptcy court has three alternatives:
( 1) It may grant the reclam~tion
request and compel the return
of the goods to the seller;
(2) It may deny such reclamation
and grant the claim of the
seller a priority as an administrative expense; or
( 3) It may secure the seller's
claim by a lien on the goods
or on other property. 5
Although all of these alternatives
are disjunctive, it is conceivable that
the bankruptcy court may grant a
partial return of goods, a lien and/ or
an administrative expense as to such
application.
However, consistent
with congressional intent to encourage rehabilitation of the debtor and
since the goods usually are needed
for continuation of the debtor's operation, the court will generally allow the debtor to keep the goods and
grant the creditor an administrative
expense priority.

In re Flagstaff Foodservice
Corporation
The two cases mentioned above
throw a good deal of light, as well as
cast certain shadows, on the seller's
ability to reclaim the goods. In the
Flagstaff case, the debtor resold a
portion of the goods and, therefore,
no longer had possession of a portion of the goods on the day that it
received the demand for reclamation.
The reclaiming creditor commenced
an adversary proceeding under Rule
701 ( 1) of the Bankruptcy Rules of
Procedure seeking reclamation and
making the requisite demand as prescribed by Section 546 (c) of the BC.
The debtor's defense was that the
creditor could reclaim only those
5

11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(2).

goods in the debtor's possession at
the time the demand for reclamation
was received and that, in any event,
the creditor could not receive payment for the value of such goods but
would have to accept a priority
status as an administrative expense
creditor based on the price of the
goods on hand. The reclaiming creditor, however, insisted that it was
entitled to an administrative expense
claim for the sales price with respect
to all of the goods delivered, or a
lien to that extent, without regard
to whether any or all of the shipped
goods could be retrieved by reclamation.
The debtor insisted that the discretion to be exercised in the application of the alternatives to reclamation set forth in Section. 546 (c),
including the granting of an administrative expense claim, could be exercised only to the extent that goods
were in the debtor's possession at the
time that it received the written
demand for reclamation.
The court first examined the common law and found that reclamation
rights were then governed by the law
of contracts which permitted rescission by a seller who was induced to
enter into a contract by a fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation.
However, the appropriate remedy
flowing from rescission was not always easy to determine. The seller's
ability to retrieve the property sold
turned on several factors, including
the identification of goods, their
fungibility, commingling, and the
like. Indeed, where the goods had
already been resold by the buyer,
the seller was allowed to trace the
funds which specifically were allocable to the seller's goods. 6
6 The court cited Weintraub & Edelman, "Seller's Right to Reclaim Prop-
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Section 2-702(2)

The court then addressed Section
2-702(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code which replaced common-law principles, indicating that
this section was "designed to afford
certainty and completeness in preference to those sources of general
law to which we were accustomed
to resort." 7 Section 2-702(2) provides:
Where the seller discovers that the
buyer has received goods on credit
while insolvent he may reclaim
the goods upon demand made
within ten days after the receipt,
but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in writing within
three months before delivery the
ten-day limitation does not apply.
Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a
right to reclaim goods on the
buyer's fraudulent or innocent
misrepresentation of solvency or
of intent to pay.
Following the analysis of this Uniform Commercial Code section,
which was predicated upon "the
existence of the goods in the seller's
possession and therefore able to be
claimed," s the court dealt with the
cases under the former Bankruptcy
Act with respect to the seller's right
to reclaim. The court indicated that
some jurisdictions had denied the
right to reclaim pursuant to Section
2-702{2) of the Uniform Cammer-

erty Under Section 2-702(2) of the
Code Under the Bankruptcy Act: Fact
or Fancy," 32 Bus. Law. 1165, ·1167
(1977).
7 In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.,
note 1 supra, at 122.
Bid.

cial Code because it merely "disguised priorities" 9 that actually resembled state statutory liens which
became effective only upon the insolvency of the debtor. Such statutory liens could be avoided under the
former Bankruptcy Act as they now
can under Section 545 of the BC.
On the other hand, other jurisdictions
have held that the right to reclaim
under the Uniform Commercial
Code is invulnerable and was nothing more than a right to rescind a
contract. This conflict among jurisdictions formed a basis for Congress'
enactment of Section 546{c) of the
BC. In essence, whatever weapons
a bankruptcy trustee might have in
his arsenal to gather the estate are
subject to the UCC statutory right or
common-law right of a seller to
retrieve his goods.
Because Section 2-702(2) of the
UCC permits the reclamation of
goods in the buyer's possession, and
does not give the seller the right to
receive the proceeds of goods already
resold by the buyer, the court in
Flagstaff was faced with the issue
of "whether, if reclamation is denied,
and the court exercises its judgment
to grant the seller a priority administrative claim or a lien, both authorized by section 546(c) (2), the extent of either will exceed the value
of the property which could be retrieved so that the full value of the
goods sold will fix the reach of the
priority or the lien." 10
In concluding that the administrative expense claim could not exceed
the price of the goods remaining in
the debtor's possession, the court focused on two "truths." First, "it must
be recognized that Congress' scheme
of priority creditors, while designed
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to achieve important policy aims
thought relevant, nevertheless distorts one of the dominant schemes
of bankruptcy-equality of distribution." n The court noted that "if
Congress meant to give the 10-day
seller so much more than he ever
had under nonbankruptcy law to
the exclusion and detriment of the
11-day seller, it would have expressed itself far more clearly." 12
The second truth is that "reorganization under chapter 11 is one of the
desired aims of Congress for the
financially pressed but honest debtor." 1a The court reads Section
546(c) (2) as striking a balance so
that the debtor has the use of the
goods it needs for its ongoing business while the seller has an administrative expense priority for the
value of the goods that the seller
would otherwise be able to reclaim
in a nonbankruptcy setting. "To
give the seller more, absent a clear
indication that this should be so,
cuts against the grain of compelling
bankruptcy themes." 14

In re Contract Interiors, Inc.
We next turn our attention to the
Contract Interiors case. The facts
indicate that on December 24, 1980,
the plaintiff shipped certain decorative goods to the debtor. Shortly
thereafter, and on February 5, 1981,
the debtor filed a petition for relief
under chapter 11. The plaintiff made
demand in writing for the return of
the goods on February 20, 1981.
Upon debtor's failure to deliver the
goods, it instituted this adversary
proceeding contending that it was in-

..

llJd. at 124.
12[d.
13 I d.
H[d.

duced to ship the goods upon a false
financial statement submitted by the
debtor, and, therefore, it was entitled to reclaim the goods either
by virtue of Section 2-702 of the
Uniform Commercial Code or based
upon a common-law right.
Focusing upon Section 546(c),
the debtor argued that a seller may
reclaim the goods it was induced to
sell by fraudulent representation only
upon the seller's complying with the
requirements of Section 546(c) and
since the demand was not made
within ten days of the receipt of the
goods, the seller is precluded from
reclaiming the goods. Counsel for
the plaintiff, however, maintained
that Section 546 dealt with the limitations of the trustee's avoiding
power and that its construction merely prevents the trustee from relying
upon its rights and powers to defeat
any statutory or common-law right
of a seller to reclaim the goods sold
in the ordinary course of business
if the seller complies with the conditions set forth in Section 546(c), but
that a seller may still rely upon any
statutory or common-law right that
it may have to reclaim goods sold to
the debtor even though there is no
compliance with the conditions set
forth in Section 546(c), and if the
seller does so, the trustee may employ all the avoiding powers to resist
the seller's claim. After examining
the authority which supported such
a position, the court reviewed the
history and background of the section in much the same light as the
Flagstaff court.
The court indicated that the legislative history of Section 546 made it
clear that the drafters intended to
retain only that part of Section 2-702
which permitted reclamation if demand was made for the return of
goods within ten days after receipt
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and to make this right to reclaim exclusive in order to put an end to the
disruptive litigation engendered by
Section 2-702 (c).
In the footnote, the court quoted
the following:
This is actually the solution that
was suggested by Weintraub &
Edelman: "Seller's Right to Reclaim Property Under Section
2.702(2) of the Code Under the
Bankruptcy Act: Fact or Fantasy," 32 Bus. Law 1165 (1977).
This recommendation was based,
in part, on the view that so limiting the right of seller to reclaim
goods would eliminate costly,
time-consuming litigation, enhance the likelihood of successful
reorganization, and give relief in
those cases in which there is an
"overwhelming aura of fraud"
cases in which sellers were induced
to deliver goods to a debtor on
the eve of bankruptcy.lf'
The court concluded that this purpose set forth in the legislative history can be given effect only if it is
held that Section 546(c) provides
the exclusive remedy for a reclaiming
creditor.
Furthermore, the court also indicated that this did not affect a seller's
right to recovery of goods in transit
which were covered by Section 2-705
of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The court therefore dismissed the
complaint.

Lessons to Be Learned
These recent cases, barring reversal, seem to be sound and logical

15 The court cites Henson, "Reclamation Rights of a Seller Under Section
2-702," 22 N.Y.L.F. 41, 49 (1975).

and have nailed down three of the
many controversial problems still extant, namely: (1) reclamation can
only cover goods in the debtor's possession at the time the written notice
is received by the debtor; (2) the
service of the written notice within
ten days of the receipt of the goods
is essential to recovery; and (3) reclamation of goods under Section
546 (c) is the exclusive remedy for
such recovery.
Where does this leave the defrauded seller? The Flagstaff court
cited existing problems of identification of goods, fungibility, commingling, and the like. The Contract
Interiors court recognized the erosion of the ten-day period caused by
lack of information of the debtor's
bankruptcy. A host of other problems may be added-delay in delivery of mail and disposition of
goods after receipt of notice if the
debtor in possession is not enjoined.
Extremely significant is the time of
receipt of goods.
Balancing the equities between the
necessity of debtors to continue to
purchase goods until the commencement of a chapter 11 case, as against
the seller's entrapment in a concealment of the debtor's insolvency, presents a difficult problem. The Contract Interiors court suggested the
possibility of additional legislation.
everal cases have indicated a practical solution: compromise between
creditors and debtors who resolve
the many complex issues by setting
up a separate class for preferential
treatment of the so-called ten-day
deliveries in the plan of reorganization. In the interim, vigilance is the
order of the day in two areas: written demand for reclamation should
be delivered by hand and the debtor's
inventory at the time of delivery of
such demand should be ascertained.

380

